Tuesday, May 11, 2021

The Time I Met Steve Jobs

May 2021

(c) Doug Meil

 

It was either 1993 or 1994 at Database and Client-Server World in Chicago.  Steve Jobs was doing a demonstration of NeXTSTEP.  After he finished he was on the floor next to the stage just standing there, barely anyone around him.  I thought of the fastest question I could think of based on his presentation and walked up to him.  He fixed me with his trademark stare and smirk and replied.  “Yep, that’s pretty much what I thought he’d say,” I thought.  Even in his wilderness period, after Apple and after the NeXT Cube, he was still loaded with attitude.

 

But let’s back up a bit.

 

I was an Apple fan of the original multi-colored logo variety.  I started programming in 1981 in middle school on an Apple //+  with an old TV for a monitor.  I was squarely in the education market so key to Apple’s early success.  I was fortunate enough that my family bought an Apple //e for our home in 1983 and that was the computer I used all through high school and college to write my papers with an Epson dot-matrix printer on continuous paper.  That’s the paper with tear-off strips on each side that had little holes so that the printer’s “teeth” could rotate it through the cylinder.  I feel old just typing that, and still I never take laser-printing for granted.

 

I understood Apple //’s hobbyist-expandability benefits first-hand and I was quite comfortable with popping the top of the case.  I added an 80-column card so that word processing was more effective and supported lower-case letters too.  That card also boosted total system memory to a whopping 128k.  I also added a modem and another 5 ¼” disk-drive, stacked upon the first floppy drive.  One of my favorite 3rd party software companies was Beagle Bros. which sold a variety of interesting nerd utilities, one of my favorites being something that could renumber “REM” (comment) lines to 65535 so they couldn’t be changed.  Apple was more than a company, it was a technical community.  I was an Apple fan for certain, but arguably at heart I was a Woz fan.  All of the technical attributes I liked about the Apple //-series computers were either designed or influenced by the “other” Steve – Steve Wozniak. 

 

I even once saw an Apple /// computer on a tour courtesy of a local computer club.  Most people know about the Apple Lisa via the insane paternity saga of the same name.  As the story goes, the Lisa computer although technically advanced was a commercial failure.  The Apple ///, however, managed to be technically problematic and a commercial failure.  Seeing an Apple /// in the field is something of a rare and dubious honor as few people in the computer industry – much less teenagers of the era - could make the claim given how few were made.  I was excited to get exposure to any computer back then irrespective of what it was.  

 

Then came the famous Mac ad in January 1984.   Macs were expensive and as we already had a functioning Apple //e there wasn’t a compelling argument to upgrade to an incompatible system, despite the fact that the Mac had a mouse and the neat graphics.  A high school teacher brought in “In Search Of Excellence” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3agg64LM88) which was filmed in the summer of 1984, and I still eagerly soaked up the Apple segment about the Mac.  Despite not being a Mac user, I was still an Apple fan.  The irony was that in a little more than a year after the filming of that propaganda coup the Mac would be lagging in the market and Steve would be out of Apple.  

 

Colleges were squarely in the education market that NeXT was targeting, and this is where I saw The Cube my senior year.  In one of the campus computer labs that I frequented I could see it sitting on a table.  I must admit seeing a NeXT Cube up close and in person was visually impressive.  I don’t ever remember seeing anyone use it.  The login box would “shake off ” bad login attempts, which I found artful and hilarious, but since neither I nor anyone else I knew had an account on the Cube that’s all I ever saw it do.  Granted, I could have pushed harder for access but at a list price of $8,000 in 1990 dollars if I was a campus computer administrator I would have been nervous to let undergraduates play with it as well.

 

A book that made a big impression on me was Accidental Empires by Robert X. Cringley (1992) which covered the development of the personal computing industry.  Apple featured large in the book. The Lisa story is bad enough and doesn’t need to be repeated here, but of all the other stories what I found the next most horrifying was how Steve screwed over early Apple employees on stock options, and Woz stepped in to be the conscience of the company and to do the right thing out of his personal stake.  For someone who claimed loudly that money wasn’t important, when it came down to it Steve Jobs didn’t want anyone else to have any if he could help it, even when they contributed to his success.  This was technical robber-baron behavior, and then some.

 

So by the time I had a chance to meet Steve Jobs in 1993/1994 he was on the heels of a highly publicized exit from Apple and a highly publicized bust with the NeXT Cube.  One could say the shine had worn off.  He was already a part of computing history to be sure, although that history didn’t have a home yet as the Computer History Museum wouldn’t be created until 1996.  And this was years before playing Steve Jobs became a sub-genre in Hollywood with “Pirates of Silicon Valley” (1999), “Jobs” (2013), and “Steve Jobs” (2015).  He was at the time I met him effectively a very rich and famous has-been, who was promoting NeXTSTEP.  I thought of one of the lines from Accidental Empires about how Steve Jobs would be “firing an Uzi into the sky and telling the rest of the world that it was full of shit” or something like that.  I kind of admired the fact that he was still working.  He didn’t need to.  "This guy just won’t stop” I thought.   

 

One of the last sections of the NeXTSTEP demo was how it had built-in support for direct database access to selected databases.  This especially piqued my interest as I had been working with ODBC (Open Database Connectivity) since ODBC 1.0 was released in 1992.  So I asked Steve whether NeXTSTEP would support ODBC for greater database support.  I didn’t really care what he thought about ODBC, I just wanted to ask him a question relevant to his presentation.  To poke him in a professional way and see what happened.  He replied ”no, because it’s too slow” with absolute certainty.  And he looked at me like he was expecting a short bus to pick me up from whatever adult day care center I had come from, seemingly amused I could get around the conference so well on my own.  “Ahhh, I see.  Thanks.”  I replied.  I didn’t come to the conference to argue about database connectivity with Steve Jobs.    

 

He had a point.  ODBC did have a bit of a rocky start but it improved and eventually became a productivity boon for both developers, analysts and tool vendors.  The ODBC pattern begat JDBC, which had similar benefits for the Java community but that would come later as Java hadn’t been invented yet.  Despite the early shortcomings of ODBC I would say Steve was strategically wrong on the pattern.  And obstinate.  But he didn’t come to the conference to argue about database connectivity either.  He was there to be right.

 

Steve would go on to rescue Apple and re-invent multiple industries.  And be generally right on a few things along the way.  I think he got better at that during this period.


Sunday, February 28, 2021

Anna Karenina Development

 

Introducing Anna Karenina Development ™

© Doug Meil, 2021

 

Update March 2021

A more serious and professional version of this was published on the Association for Computing Machinery blog site.  https://cacm.acm.org/blogs/blog-cacm/251396-anna-karenina-on-development-methodologies/fulltext

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

Sunday, February 21, 2021

The Actual History Of Explorys, Part 2 (2015 to 2018, The IBM Watson Health Years)

 

The Actual History Of Explorys, Part 2 (2015 to 2018, The IBM Watson Health Years)

© Doug Meil, 2021

 

See the prior article “The Actual History Of Explorys, Part 1 (2009 to 2015)” for the first part of the story.

 

https://themeildeal.blogspot.com/2021/01/the-actual-history-of-explorys-part-1.html

 

 

Explorys - IBM Watson Health Years

 

Much has been written about IBM Watson Health during the years 2015 through 2018…

 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/diagnostics/how-ibm-watson-overpromised-and-underdelivered-on-ai-health-care

 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/layoffs-at-watson-health-reveal-ibms-problem-with-ai

 

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/stat-ibm-watson-health-was-crumbling-long-before-layoff-announcements-10-things-to-know.html

 

https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/11/ibm-watson-health-problems-layoffs/

 

https://www.theregister.com/2018/05/25/ibms_watson_layoffs/

 

… for the record, I was not the source of any material for these articles (or any others). 

 

Some of the public criticisms of Watson Health were fair-hits and deserved, and some of what was written were cheap-shots and/or flat-out wrong.  What was undeniable was that Watson Health’s plans were ambitious, and that things didn’t turn out like the 2015 strategic PowerPoint decks had predicted and a lot of people got hurt in the process.  Why these plans didn’t work out are where the details matter.  What follows are my thoughts on some of the more frequent comments and conceptions about Watson Health, based on my experiences during this period.

 

It should be noted that my experiences with IBM went back many years before Explorys was acquired by IBM in April 2015.  I worked closely with IBM in the 1990’s, spoke once at a CICS and MQ Series Technical Conference, and also was on a project that was a case study in IBM marketing material.  IBM was also an early supporter of Java, which I respected.  I did have a few concerns about IBM, though.  For example, at a prior job we tried out Rational Studio but got tired of its interminable startup time, and went back to Eclipse which started up in few seconds and was a lot snappier.  But I still came into IBM an enthused employee and deeply knowledgeable of IBM’s history.

 

 

1)    IBM & Healthcare

 

From IEEE Spectrum:

Long before Watson starred on the Jeopardy! stage, IBM had considered its possibilities for health care

 

From STAT:

“When IBM introduced Watson Health , it already had a group of employees working with healthcare clients using its own secure cloud to store data, two former employees told STAT. The Watson division, though, began marketing another cloud, which not only appeared duplicative of IBM's existing offerings, but created competition from within.”

 

 

IBM had been in healthcare for a long time before Watson Health.  IBM Research had been undertaking various healthcare projects, and the consulting arm/s of IBM had been performing a variety of custom healthcare projects (typically on-prem deployments) utilizing IBM products such as DB2 (database), UDMH (healthcare data model), MDM (entity matching), MQ Series (messaging) and IIB (integration bus), among others.  The development of Watson for Oncology pre-dated the creation of the Watson Health division by several years.  IBM had also once been in medical devices long ago with a division in Minnesota, I was told.

 

But in general IBM didn’t have much in the way of healthcare applications.  IBM would sell you a set of tires, an engine, and a steering wheel, and the consulting hours to put them together, but it couldn’t sell you a vehicle.  That’s what Watson Health was going to address.  This was a reasonable and admirable ambition.

 

For starters, IBM’s cloud situation was – pun intended – somewhat cloudy in 2015 as there were multiple hosting groups within IBM.  The primary consumer-facing cloud service at the time was SoftLayer, itself an IBM acquisition in June 2013 - less than two years before the formation of Watson Health.  SoftLayer was “sort of IBM and sort of not IBM” in the sense that IBM Watson Health was pretty much paying the same price the public was paying, so it was hard for an acquisition make a compelling financial case for the switch from their existing hosting environments.  And from a technical perspective SoftLayer was a “cloud” (so that part was true) but it wasn’t the same class of “cloud-native” offering as AWS, Azure, and GCP for supporting programmable infrastructure-as-a-service, at least at the time.

 

 

2)    IBM Watson Health Origin & Dynamic

 

From IEEE Spectrum:

“We pivoted so many times.”

 

“While the engineers tried to follow the shifting directions from above, Phytel didn’t deliver anything new to the market.”

 

“they really thought IBM would take it to the next level—not destroy it within three years.”

 

 

From STAT:

"There was a lot of internal friction," one of the former employees told STAT. "There were two products that did exactly the same thing, that were being sold by two different parts of the company, that had two different development roadmaps."

 

“Watson Health's various business units were too focused on their own growth, which discouraged collaboration. Coupled with the company's failure to combine their newly acquired companies and align their cultures and operations, IBM was laden with duplicative products and services in a way that was all but cost efficient.”

 

 

Anyone familiar with acquisitions knows that successfully integrating a single company is hard.  What IBM tried with Watson Health was well beyond that.  On top of creating the entirely new Watson Health division in April 2015, IBM acquired a bunch of healthcare software companies…

 

·      Curam (social services software, acquired 2011.  Moved into Watson Health after the formation of the division in April 2015)

·      Explorys (healthcare & life sciences population analytics, acquired April 2015)

·      Phytel (healthcare analytics & patient contact, acquired April 2015)

·      Merge Healthcare (imaging, Fall 2015)

·      Truven (claims analytics, April 2016)

 

… to seed this new division, and then also mixed in several IBM Research healthcare assets.  At the formation most of the actual products and most of the actual customers at the formation of the division were from acquisitions.  The overall Watson Health strategy, though, was to rebuild everything that had just been acquired in the “Watson Health Cloud” on SoftLayer. 

 

It shouldn’t take a software or management guru to see the potential downsides of this approach.  For starters, there were some overlaps in acquisition functionality, which were obviously not the fault of any individual acquisition, but even that wasn’t the biggest problem.  The strategic rebuild plan, while probably beautiful when viewed from 250,000 feet, placed scant priority on evolving the acquisitions and their already deployed solutions to keep their existing customer bases happy (and growing).  This effectively would require hitting a multi-year pause for the existing solutions, and most customers don’t appreciate that.  In too many ways Watson Health operated like a billion-dollar research project that was disconnected from the market, yet still burdened with the financial expectations of a public company that wanted quarter by quarter stratospheric results.  I think even the IBM top-brass would have to grudgingly admit in retrospect that this was crazy-making. 

 

There is also a process for acquisitions called “Blue Washing” (actual IBM term).  All of the acquisitions were being requested/strongly-encouraged/mandated to convert as many technical frameworks as possible to IBM products, and this list was long.  On paper, this process does make some sense.  The trick is that when push comes to shove, who is more important?  The answer depended upon whom was asked, and within IBM there are a lot of people with opinions.  Just stack-ranking the priorities of internal IBM stakeholders – irrespective of the priorities of paying customers - is an enormous task.  The acquisitions had to balance this dynamic along with everything else that was happening in Watson Health, which was a lot.      

 

The Explorys engineering team still produced some great work in this period, kudos to the team.  But this was done within a cyclone of distractions.  In 2017 alone we had 3 Stop The World And Re-Prioritize Everything events driven by Offering Management (what IBM calls “product management”), where products went from being the #1 priority to not happening at all, and then in some cases back again.  That was just one year.  It’s really hard to get anything done with that as a backdrop - let alone sustain any velocity - because what everybody knows but nobody wants to acknowledge is that if you want plausible software estimates, you need software engineers to make them.  And if you are frequently asking said software engineers to stop what they are doing and re-plan then they aren’t building software.

 

Watson Health was a good idea, but as undertaken where were too many conflicting priorities, and it was too much to manage at once.

 

The results, at least from the Explorys perspective, could have been predicted by any relationship book or country music song:

 

·      Phase One:  The Yelling

o   Customers wanting to know roadmaps for their existing products, and looking to see continual product progress to make sure they aren’t being abandoned.

 

·      Phase Two:  The Silence

o   It seems like things are getting better when customers stop complaining, but what is actually happening is RFPs are being sent out.

 

·      Phase Three:  The Leaving

o   It was only when the contract terminations went full boil that Watson Health leadership started to care about the acquisition customer bases, but at that point it was too late. 

 

 

3)    Can We Talk About Watson?

 

From IEEE Spectrum:

In part, he says, IBM is suffering from its ambition: It was the first company to make a major push to bring AI to the clinic. But it also earned ill will and skepticism by boasting of Watson’s abilities. “They came in with marketing first, product second, and got everybody excited,”

 

 

When attending big data conferences during this period one could hear major tech companies talk about AI and machine learning projects with a fairly standard vocabulary:  unsupervised and supervised learning.  Clustering algorithms.  Classifiers and regression algorithms.  But IBM had Cognitive Computing.  Huh?  What??  That approach had contrasting effects:  technical people didn’t take Watson seriously, and business people took Watson too seriously, causing inflated and unrealistic expectations.

 

On top of that, IBM tried at the time to tie Watson to a variety of other IBM products, like only running on IBM hardware, or only being available on the IBM Cloud.  Watson was not just confusingly described, but its intelligence was artificially limited.  Acquisitions still running on their existing hosting infrastructure couldn’t easily take advantage of Watson -  whatever it was – even if they wanted to.

 

I give IBM a lot of credit for its Deep Blue Chess projects and its Jeopardy effort.  That was some innovative and out of the box thinking.  I will freely admit to having my picture taken by the Jeopardy game podium at the Yorktown Heights Research Center.  I even had a member of the Jeopardy team perform a fantastic guest talk at the nerd meetup I run (Cleveland Big Data Meetup).  Like I said, I’m a fan of these efforts.  But IBM lost its way on Watson by focusing on magic instead of technical excellence.  IBM later relabeled Cognitive Computing as something else, but the damage was done.  It was another lost opportunity.

 

 

4)    Explorys & Epic

 

From STAT:

“one of Watson's companies, Explorys, found a way to get behind Epic's firewall and use patient data to fulfill its contractual obligations with its client hospitals”

 

 

Firstly, Explorys was a part of Watson Health, not Watson.  Those were two different divisions in IBM.  While I thought IBM was pretty clear on this point for some reason it became a surprisingly frequent  point of confusion in the public, and I’ve lost count how many times I had to explain this.

 

Secondly, Explorys did not “hack” or “get behind” Epic’s firewall.  The above quote is at least half-right in that Epic integration was performed under contract with client hospitals.  Bypassing a firewall, though, is a serious allegation that minimally implies disregard for security policy.

 

During the timeframe Explorys was in business, Epic was typically deployed on-premise (i.e., in a data center leased or operated by the healthcare customer), and especially so for mid/large-sized deployments.

 

Epic has a few core data components:  Chronicles (the operational data store), and Clarity (the data warehousing platform).  Chronicles is supported on a database technology called Intersystems Cache.  Clarity is supported on Oracle, SQL Server, and Teradata. 

 

These technical factoids about Epic are all over the internet, and are not secrets.

 

Explorys was just really good at data integration.  Per the first article, I had been doing distributed data collection for over 5 years even before Explorys, and then Explorys took it to another level.

 

 

5)    The Parable Of The Whiteboards

 

How do bad decisions happen?  It’s easier than you might think, especially at a big company.  One factor is whether the person making the decision has to live the consequences of the decision.

 

Take for example the Explorys office during the 2016-2018 period, which was the first “Designed By IBM” office.  Per the first article the History of Explorys, moving offices was a core competency.  Rather than assembling our own desks as in previous Explorys offices, in this new space we now had real grown-up office furniture, which was exciting.

 

But when we moved in, we saw this…

 


 

 










 

 

 

 

 

(photo by Doug Meil)

 

… in every breakout room.  One room would have been a hilarious accident.  This was on purpose. 

 

Software engineers like monitors and whiteboards.  But this wasn’t a Reece’s Peanut Butter Cup situation where adding them together makes it better.

 

I don’t fault the installers for this.  I’m sure when they received the work-orders they probably shook their heads in puzzlement, but then thought “that’s what the paperwork says” and started making holes.  A discrete inquiry was later made as to the design intention, and the alleged response was that the configuration was a “best practice” that “merged digital with the physical.”  Which is fair, because merging things is what screws and a power drill tend to do.  It appeared that the facilities people had neither owned nor leased many dry-erase markers.  But the real question is how many people knew about this idea before it happened and said nothing about it?  Or were unable to raise concerns for fear of being labelled an “acquisition troublemaker” and a “whiteboard purist”?

 

Fortunately, this situation had a remedy:  our engineering executive finally persuaded facilities to get another set of whiteboards ordered and mounted on the opposite walls, this time without monitors installed on them.  Problem solved!  On top of managing a development organization and all of the other topics mentioned above in this article, obtaining functioning whiteboards also became an executive-level responsibility.

 

Sometimes it’s possible to recover from a bad decision.  Sometimes not so much.

 

 

Coda

 

I was appointed an IBM Distinguished Engineer (DE) in 2016, which I appreciated.  It’s a big promotion in the general sense, and it comes with a framed certificate.  It’s a process in some ways like the application for academic tenure in that one must prepare an extensive package for review by various boards and all the way up the IBM chain, but different in that DE appointments are for a specific area of executive business and technical responsibility.  While it does recognize past accomplishments, it is fundamentally a forward-looking position.  And executive has particular meaning at IBM, as DE’s are also supposed to be looking out for IBM as a whole.  I was told that DE’s should be like knights on a chessboard, which was an analogy that I liked.  It could take a couple of years to really get comfortable in the role, I was told.  As IBM DE’s are D-bands in the IBM job-grade hierarchy, the appointment also comes with executive pay structure.  The bonus algorithm is supposed to be 1/3rd about the DE, 1/3rd for the business unit results, and 1/3rd for IBM results as a whole.  I worked a full year in 2018 which was a bad year for Watson Health but IBM still made some money.  I would have been happy with a couple of Dicks Sporting Goods gift certificates and a ham sandwich as a token thank you for trying because you have been warning us for years about what eventually happened as I had left in January 2019.  When the 2018 bonuses were paid out in March 2019 mine was zero dollars and zero cents.  The message was clear:  monitors belong on whiteboards, and don’t you forget it.

 

I wish IBM the best and hope it learned something from this experience.  It was costly in terms of money, time and people.

 

 

See this link for "Explorys,  a PostScript" (2023)

https://themeildeal.blogspot.com/2023/10/explorys-postscript.html

 

 

Appendix

 

This writeup was directed at IBM and the macro-decisions that determined Watson Health’s fate.  There is always more detail to any story, but these were the major themes as I saw them.  Explorys did bring its own dash of executive dysfunction into Watson Health, however.  Reviewing what happened after Explorys is insightful into how Explorys operated both pre-acquisition and the early critical years in Watson Health.  The article below explains Cleveland’s Amazon HQ bid, and how the Unify Project somehow wrote itself into the city’s bid and described itself as being one of the most important assets in the region without having actually having done anything.  And it had blockchain too.  That really happened.  So there’s that. 

 

https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/an-essay-on-the-failed-amazon-bid-and-the-defective-philosophy-undermining-clevelands-progress/Content?oid=20653840

 

And the story continued…

 

https://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2018/08/23/the-unify-project-star-of-clevelands-amazon-hq2-bid-for-some-reason-is-finally-hiring

 

https://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2019/10/03/unify-project-is-now-unify-labs-new-partnership-with-united-way-raises-questions-eyebrows

 

https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/a-legacy-cleveland-nonprofit-struggles-for-relevance-and-financial-survival-under-ceo-august-napoli/Content?oid=32490788

 

Also for the record, I had no part in any of those articles.


Sunday, January 31, 2021

The Actual History Of Explorys, Part 1 (2009 to 2015, The Startup Years)

 

The Actual History Of Explorys, Part 1 (2009 to 2015, The Startup Years)

© Doug Meil, 2021

 

Explorys Founding

 

Explorys was founded, officially, in October 2009 via a deal with Cleveland Clinic Innovations.  The skunkworks started much earlier with a variety of conversations with Cleveland Clinic.  I got involved in the Summer of 2009.

 

Naming a startup is hard.  It consists of multiple sessions generating name ideas, and 80% of them will be terrible.  15% of them will be mediocre.  And if you’re lucky 4% of them will be decent.  And if you’re really lucky 1% of them will be good.  And not just ‘good’ – but also be trademark, service-mark, and copyright clear, and the domain name will be available.  The name Explorys came from an ad/marketing person that we were working with.  It was a good name.

 

One of the names I generated that had some traction in the ideation process was VennPoint.  Explorys is a much better name than that, but one of the name-themes I liked was intersecting sets as it represented the general idea of population exploration.  While this particular name-idea wasn’t used, the underlying notion wound up in another place:  if you look closely at the Explorys logo it was three intersecting sets in a Venn diagram.

 

 

Explorys Influence:  Everstream

 

A great deal of the initial technical direction of Explorys was influenced by experiences from Everstream (both in patterns and anti-patterns), though this aspect of the story isn’t well known.  As of writing (2021) there is a company called “Everstream” that sells business fiber connections, but this is not the same company. 

 

Everstream was a company founded in 1999 in Cleveland, Ohio that was originally a music streaming service, which targeted newspaper websites to place its music (and advert) player.  This was years before Pandora and Spotify.  Everstream might have been too far ahead of its time and the company wound up laying off most of its employees around 2002.  Everstream wandered around for a while performing odd consulting gigs and eventually found a niche in Video On Demand (VOD) data collection and reporting in early 2004.  This is when the only at-home streaming options were through the cable company (e.g., tune to channel 500 for the VOD application).  I joined Everstream at this time.  Everstream was acquired by Concurrent Computer Corporation in August 2005.  Concurrent eventually rebranded Everstream as something else, and then let the Everstream trademark lapse.  I was at Everstream/Concurrent until 2009.

 

Everstream experienced a number of interesting technical challenges:

 

·      Distributed Data Collection

o   Cable companies wanted an enterprise view of their video on demand services, but the service delivery platforms were deployed at a market level at that time due to technical capabilities of the day.  Larger customers could have dozens of markets.

o   Everstream had a remote collection device called an “IDG” (Interactive Data Gateway)

 

·      Multiple Data Sources

o   In addition to multiple markets, there were multiple source systems per market.

o   For example, for a single market there could be a streaming platform, a billing/back-office platform, and sometimes a different media asset management platform.  There was also typically another feed for provisioned settops and the associated subscriber.

o   All these data sources had to be merged together for a coherent picture.  This also raised the question of how to transform all this data into a common model, and still know where all the data came from.

 

·      Media Asset Metadata

o   There were some interesting reporting aspects around media asset metadata.

o   Streaming a movie preview was different from the actual movie, but these were related assets.  Similarly, an SD version of a movie was technically different than the HD version of a movie, but was still functionally “the same movie”.

o   A movie could be categorized multiple ways:  comedy, drama, action, etc., or a combination of categories.  So one needs to be careful about interpreting aggregate functions like summing views and dollars across categories.  

o   While video metadata is obviously a lot less complicated than healthcare, it served as a reminder of the importance of categorization.

 

Everstream was certainly not the first company to experience these types of challenges, but the value of years of hands-on experience on these topics cannot be over-stated.  I spent over 5-1/2 years at Everstream and there were a number of key experiences I learned:

 

·      Selling Software Is Hard

o   I’m not saying anything novel here, but if you’ve ever lived this you really understand it.  Especially for on-premise software deployments.

 

·      Supporting Software Is Hard, Part 1

o   Too often whatever hardware requirements we would specify (CPUs, memory, storage) for the IDG, customers would divide that specification in half to save money – especially since they had to be purchased per market (and there could be dozens).  But if anything went wrong with the IDG it was our fault.

 

·      Supporting Software Is Hard, Part 2

o   The data warehousing product was Oracle-based (typical of solutions during the period), and was often co-deployed on a sizable database server (also typical of deployments at the time) with other solutions (custom and other vendor solutions).

o   What we often found is no matter how big the server was, there was always an inevitable clash over resources between the deployed applications.  We frequently hit “scale up” limits.  I half-jokingly called this “The 49th Processor Problem” (e.g., when a database on a 48-CPU SuperDome is tapped out, where do you go from there?).  That was a lot of computing power back in the day, and arguably still is. 

o   Also, because our warehousing solution was deployed in the customer environment (as was typical of solutions at the time) we had no insight into the performance until something went wrong.  Then we were on the phone under emergency conditions, and entirely on our heels.

 

·      Oracle Is… Oracle

o   Oracle data warehousing tends to be on the pricey side, especially for enterprise features like table partitioning.

o   Everstream also had Oracle OEM pricing for the IDG (data collector) component, which had some technical and contractual requirements.

o   Oracle can be “enthusiastic” about patrolling its contracts, which can make things “exciting”.

 

 

Explorys

 

With that in mind, these were some of the core principles (or at least goals) when I started engineering Explorys in 2009:

 

·      Hosted

o   Avoid on-premise deployments

o   While being cloud-based is obvious in 2021, it was much less obvious to the market in 2009.

o   Healthcare organizations were extremely suspicious of public cloud vendors in 2009.

o   But based on the Everstream experiences, self-hosting was necessary (we used Expedient, a commercial hosting provider).  We needed to be able to move fast, and we needed to be able to control the environment and deployment process to do that. 

 

·      Data Collection

o   This was one aspect of on-premise deployments that was unavoidable.

o   However, this time we needed to own the collector device so we could make sure it was being managed appropriately.  Thus, the collector device became an appliance.

o   Fun fact:  Explorys called its collector device the HDG (Health Data Gateway) - we changed one letter.  The HDG software architecture was very different from Everstream’s IDG though.

 

·      Software Frameworks

o   Where possible, I wanted to leverage Open Source Software, and distributed frameworks.  Especially based on the Everstream experiences, I wanted to scale horizontally where-ever possible. 

 

Explorys started at a fortuitus time:  Hadoop had started in 2006, itself inspired from a number of Google papers, but was starting to go mainstream in 2009.

 

The forming of Explorys also coincided with the first Hadoop World in October 2009.  I was there with about 500 people in the Roosevelt Hotel ballroom in New York City and it was palpable that something special was happening.  People were talking about clusters of 1,000 nodes, and more - heady stuff.  No reasonable software engineer expected any of this to be easy, but rather it was about what was possible.  I managed to track down Christophe Bisciglia, one of the founders of Cloudera, the sponsor of the conference, and told him about our Big Huge Plans.  He decided right there that he wanted to work with us.  Keep in mind that Explorys had only been formally incorporated for a couple of days at that point (at most), not exactly the profile of “enterprise customer” that Cloudera was seeking, and a tiny, tiny startup in Cleveland at that.  Kudos and thanks to Cloudera for taking the chance, their support was critical.    

 

Down the road I wound up becoming an Apache HBase committer which was one of the distributed data storage frameworks Explorys utilized, on top of my day-job.  I consider myself lucky to have worked with such a smart collection of people, and Explorys benefited from many lessons learned from that open source community in particular and the Hadoop and big data communities in general.   

 

Somehow during this period I also managed to form the Cleveland Big Data Meetup in 2010.  I had personally benefitted from the open source mindset of experience sharing, and I wanted to try to bring a slice of that back to Cleveland.  I am proud to say that Cleveland Big Data has had 10 great years, and also proud that Cleveland Big Data has been a small but consistent voice in the promotion of science.

 

This brings us to the Cleveland Clinic.  On paper, Explorys was a Cleveland Clinic Innovations spinoff.  Cleveland Clinic’s partnership with Explorys was critical in terms of business endorsement.  There also were several key Cleveland Clinic staff members who were early test-users of Explorys’ early applications to give us usability feedback, and a few staff members who provided early guidance in the Cleveland Clinic data environment.  Explorys benefited from this support.  

 

That said, the technical contributions from this partnership have not been accurately described to date.  The intellectual property made available to Explorys was the eResearch/MyResearch application.  The application was effectively a prototype for web-based patient population searching, and the limited development on it had ceased in 2008. 

 

The eResearch/MyResearch application had the following attributes:

 

·      Limited to single machine

o   Microsoft stack

o   Microsoft SQL Server

o   .Net/C# web application

 

·      Limited data sources

o   The application was primarily centered around Epic (the EMR the Cleveland Clinic utilized), and Clarity (the Epic data warehouse)

 

·      Limited data size

o   Supported a subset of patients from the Cleveland Clinic population

 

·      Limited searchable features (about ~900)

o   Each searchable feature was hand-created and hard-coded to the Epic Clarity data model

o   No data standardization existed for standard ontologies like SNOMED, LOINC and RxNorm

 

No code from the MyResearch application was ever used at Explorys. 

 

Explorys’ first application was Population Explorer (later renamed Explore), which was a complete re-imagining of MyResearch, and then some.  The Explore application supported: 

 

·      Data standardization

o   Healthcare ontologies like SNOMED, RxNorm, and LOINC had been around for over a decade before Explorys started in 2009, but at the time Explorys started those tended to be viewed more as ‘research’ frameworks, and operational reporting was more centered on ICD9 and CPT codesets. 

o   Explorys took a bit of a gamble investing in data standardization when we did, but after Meaningful Use required usage of those ontologies in 2011 to start laying the groundwork for standardized data representation and interchange, we had a head start.

o   Supporting SNOMED, RxNorm, and LOINC required us to support searching across many hundreds of thousands of searchable concepts per patient – which was a sizable technical challenge (especially to be able to search it quickly, and across large patient populations).   This is a non-trivial problem and took no small amount of innovation to address.  

o   MyResearch did not support standardized data, and patient-searching on those ontologies.

 

·      Type-ahead search

o   A very user-friendly (and demo-friendly) feature of Explore. 

o   People take this kind of feature for granted in 2021, but it was kind of a big deal to do in 2009-2010, especially with medical terminology (see the above data standardization item), not just to get a term, but the most appropriate term, and the most appropriate term that we had search results for.

o   This took a lot of iteration.

o   Nothing like this existed in MyResearch.

 

·      Browse The Crowd

o   A feature to allow users to “dive into” results and navigate up and down the ontologies we supported from data standardization (e.g., SNOMED is a directed acyclic graph) with population counts of selected criteria.  This was a really slick feature, and probably one of the features I was most proud of designing.  It always demoed really well.

o   Nothing like this existed in MyResearch.

 

·      PowerSearch

o   This was a powerful feature that allowed searching not just on custom ranges for lab results and temporal searching (e.g., this happened before that) with arbitrary date periods, and features that otherwise defied summarization.

o   This kind of search obviously wouldn’t run sub-second, but the fact the query criteria could be defined through an application and run in the background (instead of writing a series of non-trivial programs) was huge for researchers.

o   Nothing like this existed in MyResearch, and this was only possible to the big data frameworks we were leveraging at Explorys.

 

·      Large population searching

o   At peak Explore could search over 60 million de-duplicated and de-identified patients 

o   And per above, supporting many hundreds of thousands of concepts per patient

o   This required extensive work in scalable data management and processing.

 

·      Complex data governance

o   MyResearch assumed that there was only a single organization’s data in the database.  Explore was built for multi-organizational support, as well as “Universe” support (the de-identified searchable cross-organizational construct).

 

Cleveland Clinic’s backing was important for Explorys in many ways.  But with all due respect to Cleveland Clinic Innovations, Explorys did its own engineering and design.  Explore was a completely different application than MyResearch.

 

Right after formation of Explorys we attended the American Medication Informatics Association (AMIA) annual conference in November 2009 as attendees.  One year later at the 2010 AMIA conference Explorys had a vendor booth and we were giving demos of the first version of Explore.  Kind of crazy, actually.  I remember doing a demo for somebody and they started asking “what if’s” that was off my demo-script, so I went with it.  After I answered his questions in Explore, he turned to a colleague and said “he just did in 20 seconds what our SAS programmer did in 3 days.”

 

In mid-2011 Explorys started developing analytic solutions for the provider sector with the Enterprise Performance Management (EPM) application with Clinical Measure and Registry functionality which became the core solution.  This leveraged and extended items from above topics such as data standardization, and also required a variety of other improvements in entity resolution (patient matching, provider matching, etc.)  SuperMart (customer-facing data marts) was released about 2012/2013.  These solutions were totally unrelated to the MyResearch prototype.

 

It took a sizable and dedicated engineering team at Explorys to make all this happen, with a lot of work, innovation, and iteration.  Hats off to the team.  We did some great work.

 

Explorys was acquired by IBM in April 2015. 

 

IBM Watson Health unfortunately blew up in mid-2018 in a very public way and Explorys was one of the casualties, but that’s another story.  The team deserved a better ending than that.  I left at the end of 2018.                  

 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/diagnostics/how-ibm-watson-overpromised-and-underdelivered-on-ai-health-care

 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/layoffs-at-watson-health-reveal-ibms-problem-with-ai

 

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/stat-ibm-watson-health-was-crumbling-long-before-layoff-announcements-10-things-to-know.html

 

For the record, I had no part in any of those articles, or any others.

 

 

Offices

 

Moving offices was a core competency of Explorys.

 

First Office

The first office (Fall 2009 to July 2010) was in the Triangle Apartment complex in Cleveland’s University Circle, right next to Case Western Reserve University.  It was in a storefront which at one time had been a Time Warner Cable billing office.  I know this because somebody once walked in and tried to return their old settop to me, explaining that he thought our storefront was still a Time Warner Cable billing office.

 

The Triangle was (and still is) an apartment complex, and another time a resident upstairs left their water running and it overflowed to our office below.  We were watching a bulge form in the ceiling tiles and it seemed to be growing in real time, and we were looking at each other thinking “is that really happening?”  We were able to get the desks out of the way just in time before it burst, and then were able to get in touch with building maintenance to get into the apartment and shut off the water.  I think we had somebody interviewing and a new-hire in the office at that moment as well.  “Welcome to Explorys!  Trust us, it’s going to be awesome!”  This happened late on a Friday afternoon, and had it happened just an hour or two later we would have been gone and it would have been flooding all weekend.  The joy of small offices. 

 

This office was my favorite in terms of walking, because within two minutes I could be strolling around the museums in Wade Oval.  I would go out for a lunch-walk most days to clear my head and think.  About a month after moving into this office I was out for a walk when I was stopped by an old couple in a car asking me how to get to the hospital.  In University Circle “hospital” is ambiguous so I had to then engage them in some conversation to find out whether they were going to Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals, or the VA.  After determining the destination, I then provided directions and some parking tips.  This kept happening every 6 to 8 weeks.  I must have one of those faces.

 

The Triangle Apartment storefronts (and parking lot) were later converted into the Uptown district.  Mitchells Ice Cream is pretty much where the first office was.

 

Second Office

The second office (July 2010 to November 2012) was in the Global Cardiovascular Innovation Center (GCIC) at E. 100th and Cedar, on the south edge of the Cleveland Clinic main campus.  On top of seeing main campus right across the street, you could hear it – helicopters would land a block away on the roof of the emergency services building.  After a while it can become tempting to tune it out as background noise and forget there was probably a patient being transported somewhere.

 

My favorite part of this office was the innovation room on the 2nd floor that had a great work-table with monitors on each end, with barstool-height swivel chairs – great for collaboration.  The walls were a giant whiteboard.  There were 2 frequently utilized treadmill desks.   One engineer got carried away on a project and walked 7 miles in one day, which doesn’t seem like that much, but try it on a treadmill - it’s painful.  The room was supposed to be a common area for all the tenants of the building, but we tended to hog it (sorry!) 

 

I enjoyed eating lunch at the main Clinic cafeteria.  I thought the food was good, and there was always a mix of staff, visitors, and patients – a constant motivating reminder of why we were doing this.  This is also back when the Clinic had already made the decision to only stock diet soda drinks and low-fat snacks, a small but noticeable improvement.  And this was also shortly after the Clinic banned smoking for employees in 2007, which was an initially an unpopular edict but it really does make sense as smoking is a major risk factor in a number of cancers, and like it or not the Clinic staff needed to set the example.  

 

Speaking of setting the example, at this time there was still a McDonalds by the main cafeteria which was the only place on main campus where one could not only legally purchase a high-octane Coke but also a quarter pounder with cheese and supersize fry - at the #1 heart center in the United States.  I’m sure the Clinic wasn’t thrilled with this unintentionally hilarious unhealthy dichotomy, and the alleged backstory was that this McDonalds had a long-term lease that somehow couldn’t be revoked.  Eventually the McDonalds was replaced with something less medically ironic, but it took a few years. 

 

Third Office

The third office (November 2012 to Aug 2016) was in the old Cleveland Playhouse complex on Carnegie on the west edge of the Cleveland Clinic main campus.  The Clinic had purchased the complex after the Cleveland Playhouse theater company moved to Playhouse Square downtown.  Technically, we were in “the old Sears building” section of the complex, whose previous tenant was the Cleveland Museum of Contemporary Art.  Coincidentally, they moved down the street near where Explorys’ first office was with a new building. 

 

The old Playhouse complex was the craziest office location I’ve ever worked in.  And it wasn’t “we have a ping pong table and bean bag chairs” crazy (we did have a ping pong table).  The complex was old and massive.  It wasn’t entirely clear to most people where the back fire-escape of our section actually led and how much of the team we would get back if anybody went out that way.  That particular door led to a warren of rooms and staircases and good luck finding your way in the dark and/or urgent conditions.  Cleveland-area SWAT teams would periodically practice room-clearing drills in the extensive basement, which was the former theater prop storage area and was horror-movie creepy.  You could find targets with spent stun gun wires lying about.  And then there were pallets of Clinic medical supplies that were either inventory overflow from next door or were stockpiled for regional disaster scenarios.  You know… normal office stuff.  

 

After we moved in we received a great tour from the building supervisor Maurice, who knew the history of the complex because his father had been the building supervisor for 40 years back when the Playhouse was in operation at that location.  Amazing history.  Margaret Hamilton, Joel Grey, and Paul Newman once performed there.  We may or may not have explored the various stages occasionally on subsequent unsanctioned tours, but my memory is hazy on this point.  The oldest theater from the 1920’s is my favorite, allegedly.  I hope if Cleveland Clinic ever redevelops that complex that it can at least keep the original theater and as much of the Philip Johnson addition as possible. 

 

There was also a Hot Sauce Williams a block or so away which had an autographed picture of Robin Williams on the wall made out to the restaurant.  I imagine this would have horrified Robin’s cardiologist if he found out that Robin had flown a few thousand miles to Cleveland for heart surgery, and then apparently went for some post-op recovery spicy ribs. 

 

Fourth Office

The fourth office (August 2016 to Summer 2018) was at 1111 Superior, downtown Cleveland.  We were in the 26th to 28th floors - the former Eaton executive floors, refurbished for the proletariat.  Great views.  Being downtown for the 2016 World Series was exciting (and crushing). 

 

I was a huge fan of the downtown Heinen’s.  The old Cleveland Trust Rotunda and salad bar made for a great lunch experience.  This building pre-Heinens was featured in The Avengers (as a bank that was being attacked by the Chitauri) and Captain America: Winter Soldier (as a Hydra secret lair).

 

During our time in this office I was stopped twice by drivers asking me where the Justice Center was and how to get there.  I must have still had one of those faces.

 

Fifth Office

The fifth office (Summer 2018) was a new building at E. 105th and Cedar back next to the Cleveland Clinic.  This building was in planning for years, but by the time it was built the business had unfortunately caved.  It’s a nice office, though.

 

 

See this link for Explorys, Part 2 (2015 to 2018, the IBM Watson Health Years):  

https://themeildeal.blogspot.com/2021/02/the-actual-history-of-explorys-part-2.html

 

Appendix

 

Why was there such a disconnect in the Explorys origin story?  It’s complicated, but reviewing what happened after Explorys is insightful.  The first article below explains Cleveland’s Amazon HQ bid, and how the Unify Project somehow wrote itself into the city’s bid and described itself as being one of the most important assets in the region without having actually having done anything.  Few cities had a realistic chance in this bid process so Clevelanders shouldn’t be that disappointed at not winning, but Cleveland at least deserved an honest entry.  

 

https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/an-essay-on-the-failed-amazon-bid-and-the-defective-philosophy-undermining-clevelands-progress/Content?oid=20653840

 

And the story continued…

 

https://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2018/08/23/the-unify-project-star-of-clevelands-amazon-hq2-bid-for-some-reason-is-finally-hiring

 

https://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2019/10/03/unify-project-is-now-unify-labs-new-partnership-with-united-way-raises-questions-eyebrows

 

https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/a-legacy-cleveland-nonprofit-struggles-for-relevance-and-financial-survival-under-ceo-august-napoli/Content?oid=32490788

 

Can’t make this stuff up.

 

Also for the record, I had no part in any of those articles